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Abstract
In this article we look at a country, Finland, where economic nationalism had a major influence on government policy and on the development of business enterprises from the mid-19th century to the end of the millennium. During this time period, the Finns managed to combine export-oriented economic strategy with exceptionally nationalistic economic policies, even though they could not mould international trade regimes in a way that was beneficial for them.Yet, nationalism also had negative effects. Instead of limiting their activities on the protection of truly vital national interests, the Finnish authorities went on to create a highly restrictive system that placed severe obstacles in front of all foreigners who were willing to invest or work in Finland.
Social scientists tend to argue that there are three major ideologies or schools of thought in political economy: Marxism, economic liberalism and economic nationalism. 1 They have also concluded that the last of these has received considerably less attention from scholars than its main competitors. 2 In recent years, a number of students of International Political Economy have worked hard to fill this gap. While doing so, they have recognised that previous scholarship has not properly analysed the various ways nationalism can influence economic policies and development. In particular, they have underlined the need to look at the specific content of nationalist projects instead of simply labelling protectionist or autarkic policies as economic nationalism.
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In this article, we will examine Finland, where economic nationalism has had a major influence on government policy and on the actions and development of business enterprises during the last 150 1 For example, Gilpin, Political Economy, chapter 2; Nakano, "Theorising economic nationalism", 211; Levi-Faur, "Economic nationalism", 359; Helleiner, "Economic Nationalism as a Challenge", 307. 2 For example, Nakano, "Theorising economic nationalism", 211; Kettunen, The Tension, 286; "Economic nationalism", 359. 3 See for example, Abdelal, National Purpose; Helleiner and Pickel, eds. , Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing; Crane, "Economic nationalism." years. For example, the Finnish legislation on foreign direct investment was, between 1939 and the early 1990s, ''arguably the most restrictive in the developed world'', as Ha-Joon Chang from the University of Cambridge has written. 4 The Finnish case is interesting also for two other reasons.
Firstly, Finland, originally a poor country compared to most Western European countries or even neighbouring Sweden, managed to catch up with the West. By the end of the millennium, it had become one of the world's wealthiest countries. 5 Secondly, the Finns combined export-oriented economic strategy with exceptionally nationalist economic policies, even though they, as representatives of a small country, could not modify international trade regimes to suit them.
This article discusses the origins and role of economic nationalism in Finland. We are able to build partly on the earlier work done by several Finnish scholars, in particular Markku Kuisma, Riitta
Hjerppe, Karl-Erik Michelsen and Timo Myllyntaus 6 , but are also able to take advantage of the insights of recent theoretical literature on economic nationalism, which has not been properly applied to this case.
It is suggested that the strong Finnish growth performance was to a large degree a result of the creation of a successful export-oriented national strategy, but that economic nationalism had also negative side effects which undermined Finnish economic development and its ability to adapt to economic globalisation. These negative effects have often been overlooked in historical research.
New theoretical perspectives on economic nationalism
The relative lack of interest on economic nationalism is partly due to the fact that it, unlike socialism or liberalism, is not a coherent theoretical construction. 7 Friedrich List, the most important advocate of economic nationalism during the 19 th century, underscored the need to protect infant industries with protectionist tools. Since then, economic nationalism has commonly been associated with protectionist or autarkic policies, as well as policies that support domestic industries or place restrictions on foreign direct investment. Ironically, the concept has been much more popular among liberals than amongst the (alleged) nationalists. Liberals tend to classify as 4 Chang, "Regulation", 697. 5 In more detail, see Ojala, Eloranta, and Jalava, eds., The Road to Prosperity. The book also includes extensive quantitative evidence. 6 Kuisma, "Government Action"; ---, Cooperation; Michelsen and Kuisma, "Nationalism", Myllyntaus 
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Some of the foreign-owned enterprises were transferred to Finnish hands after bankruptcies or other difficulties. In many other cases, the businessmen gradually assimilated to the domestic business elite. This was by no means a new phenomenon because from the Middle Ages onwards, Finnish cities had attracted foreign merchants, who had moved to the country and then gradually became a part of the local society.
Economic nationalists often see strong foreign involvement in the economy as a threat to their country's independence. Kauppalehti, a business newspaper, argued in 1911 that foreign capital and experts bring economic benefits, but also "break up the national culture." The "foreign habits and languages" damage "a nascent nation just creating a modern, distinguishing culture using its own vernacular." 24 The Finnish and Russian authorities placed first restrictions on foreign business activities in Finland from 1830s onwards. For example, in 1851 it was decreed that foreigners (except Russian noblemen) had to get a permit from the Czar to buy land. This meant that the country's forests could not move permanently to foreign hands. After 1883 foreigners could not engage in mining operations without a license, and three years later they were forbidden to enter banking business. In 1889, they lost the right to build or operate railroads, and finally in 1895 it was 22 For example, Myllyntaus, "The Finnish Model", 630; Hjerppe and Ahvenainen, Foreign enterprises, 286; Ylä-Anttila, Ali-Yrkkö, and Nyberg, Foreign ownership, 253. 23 Särkkä, Valtonen, Turunen, and Valtonen, "The economic and social networks of business leaders." 24 Quoted and translated in Myllyntaus, Electrifying Finland, 61. decreed that the majority of the board members of a limited liability company had to be Finnish citizens.
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As a remote country that had relatively few natural resources and a small domestic market, Finland could not hope to attract as much foreign direct investment (FDI) as many other Western countries.
The new restrictions probably discouraged foreign investments even more, though not as much as one could expect. For example, the Norwegians, who had substantial experience in sawmilling, recognised that Finland with its considerable forest resources offered them attractive business opportunities. One did not have to own the land were the trees stood because wood could be bought from landowners or from businessmen who had acquired rights to utilise forests owned by the government or private owners. Many Norwegians moved to Finland from the late 1860s onwards.
The best known of these was Hans Gutzeit, whose company W. nation or independence, as Kauppalehti feared. Many newcomers were gradually assimilated into the general population, and truly multinational companies had not set their foot in Finland.
More threatening plans had, however, appeared in the horizon. From the 1890s onwards, foreign investors were planning to exploit the Imatra Rapids, which were located in Eastern Finland, to generate energy for St. Petersburg, the Russian capital. The rapids were among best-known tourist attractions of Finland, but they were also the most important potential source of hydropower for the country, which had few alternative sources of energy. If the electricity was directed to St.
Petersburg, the Finnish industry could not utilise this crucial source of power, except perhaps on a limited scale. 28 A German company, Metallgesellschaft, was also planning to start copper mining operations in Outokumpu, and export the ore to Germany for refining.
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Real and imagined attempts by foreigners to exploit Finland's natural resources provided fuel for rising economic nationalism. In 1917, when Finland declared itself independent after the collapse of the Russian Empire, nationalist notions rose forcefully to the surface. The same happened in many other new independent states, which emerged from the ruins of Austro-Hungarian, Russian and German empires in the Eastern half of Europe. For relatively poor countries, which had just freed themselves from foreign domination, economic nationalism offered a way to assert their independence and to promote economic development.
30
The public opinion and politicians were eager to limit foreign activities in Finnish business life, and new regulations instituted in 1919 reflected this fact. From now on, foreigners had to get a permit to set up a business in Finland, and to guarantee in advance that the government and the municipalities would get required taxes and other charges. 31 A new law specifically forbid the export of electricity that had been generated from indigenous sources, and hence the hydropower resources of Imatra were reserved for domestic use.
32
It proved easy to push foreign investors out because many of them were eager to go. A bitter Voima was set up to utilise hydropower resources of the Imatra rapids. In the 1930s, the new power plant and other establishments in the same Vuoksi River produced more hydropower than all the other similar plants in the country together.
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The government had acquired Gutzeit in order to ensure that the company would not end up in the hands of new foreign owners. The Imperial German government had behind the scenes urged the Finnish government to act so that the company would not end up in the hands of British investors.
The Finnish government did as they were urged, but in reality there were even more concerned about the possibility that the company might otherwise acquire German owners.
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Yet, the government officials who had organised the purchase of Gutzeit did not only try to enhance the independence of the country, but also shift the balance of power within industry from old Finnish private companies watched with certain anxiety the expansion of the role of the government in business. Yet, the forest industry, the most important branch of the manufacturing sector, had a bigger potential threat to think about: many influential Finns were not at all convinced that the country should place its fate on industry.
Industrialisation is often considered to be one of the most important aims of economic nationalists.
Yet, this is not always the case. Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List did not reject the importance of agriculture, but rather aimed at balanced development of a society, where both industrial and agricultural groups could survive and prosper. Uneven development of a society could weaken the cohesion of a nation, which from the point of view of nationalists, would have been highly unsatisfactory.
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According to Rawi Abdelal, 'What societies want depends on who they think they are'. 41 In the early decades of the Finnish industrialisation, many nationalist believed that populous independent Finnish-speaking peasantry represented the most 'genuine' and 'natural' part of the country's society. Hence, it should be supported and expanded. Industry, in contrast, was seen as a foreign ingredient that was mainly run by Swedish-speaking 'alien' elements and foreign entrepreneurs, and which undermined traditional social structures of an agrarian society. The Civil War of 1918 seemed to prove that these critics had a point. Urban industrial proletariat had formed the backbone 38 Michelsen and Kuisma, "Nationalism", 351-352. 39 Ibid., 352. 40 Nakano, "Theorising economic nationalism", 226. 41 Abdelal, National Purpose, 1.
of the rebellious 'Red' forces that had tried to take over the country. The victorious 'White' army, i.e., the government's troops, had mainly consisted of Finnish-speaking independent peasants and, to lesser degree, members of the middle classes who were now seen as the saviours of the country.
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Furthermore, a severe shortage of foodstuffs during the First World War and the cessation of traditional imports from Russia encouraged the Finns to expand domestic agricultural production.
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The timber, pulp and paper companies wanted to expand their land holdings in order to secure their raw materials supply. The farmers and their political supporters opposed this and wanted to keep the land in the hands of agricultural producers. Moreover, many poor families in the countryside were dreaming of a farm of their own. The industrialists lost this political struggle, and laws that severely limited their right to buy land were passed. Hence, most of the Finnish territory remained in the hands of independent peasants, and the industry had to buy wood from them.
44
The peasantry and their political representatives gradually learned to appreciate the considerable stumpage income the farmers got from industry that had to buy their wood and processed into products sold to foreign countries. Hence, the agrarian interests eventually accepted the vision highlighted by List and Hamilton, namely a balanced society where both industry and agriculture could prosper. The strong role of forest industries gradually became a strong part of Finnish national identity. In short, the relationship between economic processes and nationalism turned out to be a two-way street: nationalism influenced Finnish economic development, but the latter eventually also changed the way the majority of Finns viewed their country: successful and modern industry became a 'natural' part of Finland.
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In general, it would be wrong to classify Finnish forest industrialists, regardless of their mother tongue or ethnicity, as anti-Finnish or anti-nationalistic persons. In comparison to most other Finns, export-oriented industrialists were certainly more cosmopolitan in outlook because they had extensive international trading links, better language skills, and greater knowledge of foreign cultures, but their behaviour nevertheless revealed an implicit but clear national perspective toward world trade. The forest industrialists saw themselves as representatives of Finnish industry, not simply independent businessmen. This social cohesion reflected largely economic realities, and in 42 Kuisma, Sodasta syntynyt, 172-177. 43 Hjerppe and Lamberg, Changing structure, 395. 44 Kuisma, Cooperation. , [419] [420] [421] [422] Compare with Fougner, "Economic Nationalism", 177.
particular a lack of resources that had forced entrepreneurs throughout the centuries to co-operate with each other when launching large ventures.
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In [1917] [1918] , the loss of the exceptionally vital Russian markets as a result of the disintegration of the Empire forced paper and pulp producers to join forces and to set up joint export associations in order to establish a presence in the non-Russian markets. At the same time, they tried to defend themselves against Imperial Germany, which tried to expand its economic influence in Finland.
Although the German threat soon disappeared, the co-operation continued, and for most of the 20 th century, the main Finnish export industries operated in the world markets as strong national export cartels and did so in a successful fashion. The poor peripheral small nation eventually became one of the leading producers of pulp, board and paper in the world markets.
47
In a way, the strict restrictions on FDI gave too negative of an impression on the attitude of the Finns towards international economic exchange. They were eager to keep raw material sources and production capacity in domestic hands, but at the same tried to build an increasingly export-oriented economy. Both the government and private investors, such as commercial banks, which had a strong role in the economy, channelled funds to large forest, engineering and shipbuilding companies that relied on foreign demand. 48 Although these companies were large entities in Finnish context, they were small in international comparisons, and hence it seemed wise to join forces and set up various co-operative export ventures. Export cartels are not necessarily nationalist organs, but the Finnish industrialists did have a clear national perspective. Belgian chemical giants to set up a joint subsidiary, Finnish Chemicals, in Finland. The plant produced bleaching chemicals for Finnish forest industries, but the government was more interested in the fact that it produced substances important for national defence.
Second World War and the Cold War
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The Dixon family, which needed pulp for their British paper mills, had a close ally in Finland, Gösta Serlachius, one of the country's most influential industrialists. He also agreed to sell a plot of land to Waldhof, a German company which built a pulp mill in Eastern Finland, where he himself did not operate. In internal meetings of the Finnish forest industry, Serlachius spoke in favour of free competition, but most other forest industrialists resented the arrival of the Germans, who were dominant actors in the Northern European paper trade and hence dangerous competitors.
Nevertheless, the government, and sellers of wood accepted the entry of Waldhof and Dixon because their greenfield investments created jobs and increased demand for wood in the middle of the Great Depression. Furthermore, as almost all the other plants in the country were in domestic ownership, few individual foreign subsidiaries did not necessarily pose a threat to national security.
The authorities did not therefore employ all the legal measures in their disposal to regulate the activities of Waldhof. foreigners' rights in various fields. They could not, for example, freely lead travel agencies and 50 Michelsen, Sähköstä. 51 Häggman, Metsän tasavalta, [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] Silvennoinen, Paperisydän, [328] [329] [330] [331] 338, [345] [346] [347] [348] [349] [350] [351] [352] . 52 Chang, "Regulation", 697. 53 Hjerppe and Ahvenainen, Foreign enterprises, 290; "Laki ulkomaalaisten sekä eräiden yhteisöjen oikeudesta omistaa ja hallita kiinteätä omaisuutta ja osakkeita." H. Berghell. Suomen Paperi-ja Puutavaralehti 19/1939. auction houses, publish newspapers or work as a real estate agent. 54 In some cases, it is exceptionally hard to see why the restrictions were necessary.
Events during the late 1940s onwards seemed to suggest that the law of 1939 had been necessary.
Finland had managed to avoid Soviet occupation during the Second World War, and retain its democratic political system and capitalist economic structure, but after the war the Soviets tried to use various economic and political means to expand their influence. In the conference of Potsdam in the summer of 1945, the three victorious powers of the Second World War, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, agreed that the Soviets should take over German property in a number of Eastern and Central European countries, including Finland.
The Soviets got less than they probably expected: the strict regulations and the remoteness of Finland had ensured that there were not many German-owned companies in the country. Most of the 65 joint stock companies that the Soviets did acquire were small or otherwise insignificant.
Many turned out to be economically weak and could not survive without their previous owners and managers. Politically, they were not, however, totally useless. The Soviets, for example, channelled funds to local communists through these companies. In the mid-1950s, the Soviets decided to give up most of the assets they had acquired in the 1940s in Finland and in other countries. They kept some companies that played an important role in Soviet-Finnish trade. This was yet another attempt to prevent natural resources from falling into the hands of foreigners, but it is hard to understand why it was necessary. There was little evidence that foreign companies were planning to invest in Finland, and even if they had such desires, the Finnish In the course of the 20 th century, the Finns built a strong national economy, largely based on domestic raw materials. If the authorities had not placed any restrictions, it would have seemed likely that iron ore would have been shipped to Germany, hydropower to St. Petersburg and timber resources to Britain, Sweden and Germany. These were not theoretical fears; we know from detailed historical studies that foreign companies had concrete plans about the export of these resources at the beginning of the 20 th century. Government involvement helped to ensure that these resources formed the basis of growing Finnish manufacturing industries, which eventually became a backbone of the country's economy.
Yet, the Finns probably went too far. It was understandable that the authorities and general population were eager to keep the country's most important natural resources in domestic hands.
However, instead of limiting their activities on the protection of the truly vital interests, the Finnish authorities went on to create a system that placed severe obstacles in front of all foreigners who were willing to invest or work in Finland, regardless of what they were going to do. By placing too many restrictions on the few foreigners who were willing to invest or move to Finland, the Finns denied themselves the benefits-money, knowledge and contacts-that outsiders could have brought to the country. It seems likely that they could have been allowed to establish a presence in many sectors of the economy without endangering the nation's independence. 67 Michelsen, Yrittäjyyden paradoksi.
